American definition of terrorism, international law and geopolitical reality

1. One concept, several legal systems

In public debate, the word 'terrorism' is often used as if there were one precise definition applicable equally to criminal proceedings, foreign policy, sanctions, war and historical description. The legal reality is more complicated. The United States itself uses several definitions for different purposes. Federal Criminal Law works with concepts international terrorism and domestic terrorism; the Foreign Office report law has a narrower definition of politically motivated violence against non-combatant objectives; immigration law contains its own very broad category terrorist activity; and the special law allows the Foreign Minister to designate the foreign organisation as FTO.

That's the first key to understanding the apparent contradictions. When the US government calls the group a terrorist, it can be a well-defined legal act with criminal, financial and immigration consequences. When the same term is used by a politician in a speech, it can only be a political evaluation. And when violence is taking place within an armed conflict, the legal assessment may be more important in terms of whether it was a deliberate attack on civilians, a non-discriminating attack, hostage taking or spreading terror among the civilian population.

Therefore, with each claim "X is terrorism" it is necessary to add two questions: under which legal regime and with what legal consequence. Without them, a criminal definition, a penalty list and a moral judgment are easily mixed.

2. American definition of terrorism: four distinct layers

18 U.S.C. Article 2331 define "international terrorism 'and" domestic terrorism' by combining dangerous infringements, a deterrent or coercive intent and a geographical element. The law explicitly includes the intention to intimidate the civilian population, influence government policy by intimidation or coercion, or influence government behaviour by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.

However, different definitions apply to the Foreign Office. 22 U.S.C. Article 2656f (d) For the purposes of annual reports, terrorism is defined as preplanned, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets committed by sub-national groups or secret agents. This wording is narrower and institutionally different from Article 2331.

Differences are not technical detail. For example, "state terrorism" may be essential that the definition of the State Department is constructed around sub-national groups and clandestine agents, while violations of international law by the State are typically analysed through the prohibition of the use of force, rules of war management, human rights or state responsibility.

3. Domestic terrorism: definition exists, domestic list of organisations not

US law knows the legal definition of domestic terrorism, but the federal system does not have an analogous formal process to "design" a domestic political or extremist organization, as it refers to as FTO abroad. The current overview of the Conventional Research Service from 2026 explicitly points out that there is no official domestic design process and that individuals cannot simply be accused of a separate general federal offence called "domestic terrorism."

It basically means that the perpetrator can be investigated as a domestic-terrorist thrat, but prosecuted for murder, use of explosives, hate crime, assault on federal officials, conspiracy, weapons or other specific facts. The difference from the FTO system is also important for freedom of association: to create a federal domestic blacklist of political groups would raise significant issues of the First Amendment, due process and historical abuse of security apparatus against political movements.

Critical asymmetry is therefore real, but it has a legal explanation: foreign organisations are subject to the FTO regime, while domestic extremism is addressed by a combination of criminal law and investigative categories. This does not mean that domestic political violence is legal; it means that legal instruments are different.

4. Foreign Terrorist Organizations: who decides and according to what

According to 8 U.S.C. Article 1189 The Foreign Minister may designate the organisation FTO if it is foreign, participate in terrorist activity or terrorism - or retain the ability and intention to carry out such activities - and this activity threatens the security of US citizens or US national security. "National Security" is wider than immediate physical defence; the legal regime also works with foreign relations and economic interests.

The FTO's design is not just a political statement. The law provides for a publication in the Federal Register, a possibility of judicial review at the federal court of appeal and the mechanisms for recovery. The organization can therefore challenge the legality of design, even if the government can work with classified material. The legal consequences affect not only the organisation itself, but also third parties, banks and service providers who have to assess the penalty and criminal risk.

The design shall be based on an administrative record which may include classified information. The law allows the use of classified material which may not be made publicly available in judicial review and which may be submitted to the court ex part and in camera. This is a significant security tool, but it also creates a classic tension between the protection of intelligence sources and the ability of the entity concerned to fully challenge the evidence.

The FTO is therefore not a neutral "world catalogue of all terrorists." It is an American legal status with specific criteria, which include the relationship of the organisation's activities to the US security. A different State may classify the same group differently, or use another list, as appropriate. The UN's international sanctions regimes are a separate layer.

5. Material support: criminal consequences of design and the limits of freedom of expression

The key practical consequence of FTO status is 18 U.S.C. Article 2339B. 19. In September 2026, the law provides for up to 20 years in prison for the conscious provision of a "material support or resources" marked FTO; if a person dies as a result of an act, the sentence may be significantly higher. "Material support" includes not only money or weapons, but also services, training, expert advice, personnel, transport, accommodation and other forms of support.

Decision of the Supreme Court The Commission therefore concludes that the measures in question are compatible with the internal market. Humanitarian Law Project is crucial to the border of this regime. The Court has accepted a ban on coordinated support for a designated organisation even if it is training in non-violent dispute resolution or legal action, because the coordinated service, according to Congress, can release other resources from the organisation and give it legitimacy. At the same time, the judgment does not explicitly extend Paragraph 2339B to an independent advocacy: for example, an individual can publicly defend the organisation's political objectives if he does not coordinate with it. The difference between independent and coordinated "service" is essential for the first amendment.

The most important constitutional case is The Commission therefore concludes that the measures in question are compatible with the internal market. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). The applicants wanted to train, inter alia, PKK members in the application of international law to resolve disputes in non-violent manner and to assist with UN submissions. The Supreme Court held that Paragraph 2339B could be applied to such coordinated support, even if the intended objective was legal and non-violent activity. At the same time, the court stressed the difference between coordinated support for the FTO and independent advocacy: the law does not prohibit individuals from saying separately that they agree with or promote political change without coordination with the organisation's objectives.

This construction has two meanings. From a security perspective, it is based on the assumption that resources and legitimacy are fungible within the organisation and even peaceful support can make violence capacity available. From the perspective of civil liberties, this is a very broad intervention, because a coordinated expert council can be criminalised even when the content of the Council itself promotes non-violence.

6. FTO, SDGT and financial penalties: similar names, other legal routes

In addition to FTO, there is a special Designer Global Terrists regime according to Executive Order 13224 and related sanctions authorities. FTO is an organization designated by the Foreign Minister under the Immigration Act. The SDGT may be a person, organisation or other entity blocked in the penalty system. The Treasure / OFAC then manages the SDN list and financial blocking. One organisation may be both FTO and SDGT, but both statutes are not identical and may be cancelled at a different time.

It is therefore important to distinguish between the wording "delested as an FTO," "removed from the SDN List," "SDGT design restored" and "State Sponsor of Terralism rescinded." Each means a different change in the legal regime. Syria provided an example in 2025-2026, where various layers of sanctions and design were gradually changing.

7. State Sponsors of Terrorism: State Design as an Instrument for Foreign Policy

State Sponsors of Terrorism is the US legal regime for states where the Foreign Minister will determine that they have repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism. The design triggers restrictions on foreign aid, defence exports, dual-use technologies and other financial and legal consequences. This is not an ICJ or ICC judgment and does not create a universal international legal status.

In August 2026, there was a significant change: The Ministry of Finance and Foreign Affairs has announced the abolition of Syrian design, effective 24. August 2026. The Federal Register subsequently stated that Syria is no longer the "Terrorism List Government" for the relevant sanctions. After this, they remained on the list of Cuba, Iran and North Korea.

The mechanism itself shows that design is a legally-political tool. The law sets out the criteria for classification and abolition; however, the decision is made by an executive in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, it cannot be inferred from the sentence "the State is not on the US list" that its armed forces never commit acts that could be illegal under another legal regime. Similarly, the presence on the list does not replace the evidence of a specific war crime or individual responsibility.

8. Why does the UN still not have one universal definition of terrorism?

The international community has adopted a number of sectoral anti-terrorism conventions - such as aircraft hijacking, hostage taking, terrorist bombing, terrorist financing or nuclear terrorism. Yet for decades, Member States have not agreed on a comprehensive convention with a universally accepted definition.

Absence of a single general definition does not mean a legal vacuum. The international community has built a so-called a sectoral system of conventions that criminalise specific negotiations - aircraft hijackings, civil aviation attacks, hostage takings, attacks against protected persons, terrorist bombings or terrorist financing. Thus, the practical consensus is significantly wider than the consensus over a single abstract definition. The long-standing dispute surrounding the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is focused mainly on the relationship between terrorism, national liberation and the activities of the armed forces during the conflict.

Current materials The Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly confirm that the work on draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism continued also during the period 2025-2026. The points of dispute relate, inter alia, to the armed forces of the States, international humanitarian law, national liberation and self-determination. Some states demand that the definition specifically include "state terrorism," others reject this approach.

However, the absence of one definition does not mean a legal vacuum. The hijacking of a civilian aircraft, hostage taking, financing of defined acts of violence or attacking civilians can be punishable by specific treaties and national laws. Moreover, international humanitarian law prohibits attacks on civilians and violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.

9. Terrorism and armed conflict: why does not the label replace the IHL

The International Committee of the Red Cross stresses that the IHL does not provide one general definition of terrorism, but prohibits much of the acts that are commonly referred to as terrorist in the ordinary language: intentional attacks on civilians, non-discriminating attacks, hostage-taking, use of human shields and acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population. These rules apply to both state and non-state parties to the armed conflict.

The ICRC stresses that the IHL itself has already banned a number of acts which are commonly called terrorism in common language: intentional attacks against civilians, hostage taking or acts or threats of violence, the main purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population. Therefore, the designation of an armed group as "terrorist 'does not reduce the protection of civilians or abolish the rules on the treatment of detainees. Nor does the State have the right to rule out a ban on torture or the principle of differentiation and proportionality.

At the same time, the IHL recognises the attack on a legitimate military target under conditions of distinction, proportionality and preventive measures. The fact that such an attack will cause fear among civilians does not in itself make it a "terrorist attack" in the sense of the IHL. The key is the goal, the way the attack is conducted and its predictable civilian consequences.

That's essential to the dispute over armed groups. The FTO designation of the group does not mean that the IHL ceases to apply when the conflict reaches the legal threshold of armed conflict. The ICRC explicitly rejects the idea that there is a single global war against the abstract phenomenon of "terrorism"; it carries out classification by specific parties, intensity and organisation of violence.

10. Anti-terrorism, self-defence and the use of force between states

Once the counter-terrorist operation crosses another state's borders, the next legal layer comes in: jus ad bellum. The UN Charter in Article 2 (1) of the Agreement shall apply from 1 January 2016. In general, the threat of force against territorial integrity or political independence of states is prohibited by force or by force. Article 51 shall maintain the right to individual or collective self-defence in an armed attack until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures.

After the attacks, 11. In September, the practice in which states derive self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter also applies to non-state armed groups. The least consensual is the use of force in the territory of a third State without its consent to the justification that this State is "unable or unwilling" to eliminate the threat. The United States used this concept in various operations; however, its precise status in ordinary international law remains questionable. It is therefore necessary to separate the domestic American authorisation of the operation from the international law title to use force in foreign territory.

After 11. On September 2001, the US Congress adopted Authorization for Use of Military Force, Public Law 107, Closing 40. The President was empowered to use the "necessary and appropriate force" against the states, organisations or persons that planned, authorized, committed or supported the attacks of 11. September or hidden such actors. In the following decades, there was a dispute over the scope of the concept of associated forces and the geographical limits of this mandate.

Double legitimacy is important: the US domestic legal basis and the international legal basis are not the same. The AUMF may give the President authority under US law, but it is necessary to deal separately with the consistency of the intervention with the UN Charter, the agreement of the Territorial State, the right to self-defence and the rules of the IHL. The domestic law of another State cannot in itself change the obligations arising from international law.

11. "State terrorism 'and the symmetry of the rules

Term state terrorism is common in political science and historical literature, but is not once a universal legal fact. State violence is typically qualified through specific rules: illegal use of force, aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance or other violations of human rights.

However, the criticism of the double standard is aimed at a real language problem. If a non-state organization deliberately kills civilians in order to create fear, the public will almost automatically call it terrorist. If a state uses such tactics, the media and governments will more often reach for IHL categories or state responsibility. Legally, this terminology may be correct, because actors have a different legal status. Politically, however, it may give the impression that the same type of civilian suffering is assessed by another dictionary according to the identity of the perpetrator.

12. State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are different axes

International law distinguishes between whether the infringement has been committed by the State as a carrier of international obligations and whether a particular natural person is liable for criminal offences. The State may violate the prohibition of the use of force, the principle of non-interference or the obligation to respect the IHL. As a result, the obligation to terminate the negotiations may be to provide guarantees of non-repetition and reparation.

International criminal law, on the other hand, requires proof of individual responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or the crime of aggression within a well-defined jurisdictional framework. The political representative is therefore not liable only because his state lost the dispute before the ICJ; and on the contrary, the absence of an international judgment does not have to rule out individual criminal proceedings.

13. ICC: jurisdiction, complementarity and relationship with the United States

The United States is not a Contracting Party to the Rome Statute. But that's not the same as the absolute absence of jurisdiction over an American citizen. According to Article 12 of the Rome Statute the court may, under normal conditions, exercise jurisdiction where the relevant crime has occurred in the territory of the Contracting State or where it is accused of being a citizen of the Contracting State. The non-Member State may accept the jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis and the Security Council may refer the situation to the court without the Member State concerned being a member.

This is why the ICC can theoretically assess the conduct of a citizen of a non-Member State committed in the territory of the State which has accepted the jurisdiction of the court. At the same time, the principle of complementarity applies: the ICC is designed to complement national jurisdictions, not as an automatic appeal over all domestic courts. The admissibility depends, inter alia, on whether the State is actually investigating or prosecuting and whether it is willing and able to do so in an authentic manner.

In a public dispute, three questions often mix up: jurisdiction (can the court legally discuss the case?) admissibility (is it to be discussed in the light of complementarity and seriousness?) and enforceability (can the defendant be actually arrested and handed over?). The ICC does not have its own global police apparatus; its practical power therefore depends on cooperation between states.

14. American Servicembers' Protection Act: Sovereign Against Universalist Criminal Justice

American American Servicemmbers' Protection Act of 2002 it limits certain forms of cooperation with the ICC and protects defined American and Allied persons. The most famous provision is 22 U.S.C. Article 7427which authorises the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to obtain the release of a designated person detained by, or on behalf of, the ICC. It was this wording that gave the law the publicist nickname "Hague Invasion Act."

But nicknames aren't legal. The law does not automatically order military operations and contains a wider set of tools and restrictions. Its importance is institutional: it shows that the United States has long refused to allow the unacceptable international jurisdiction, without their consent, to function over their personnel in the same way as the citizens of the Contracting States. Internationalist view is about the tension between reciprocity of rules and the sovereignty exception; from the US perspective, about protecting constitutional and national procedural guarantees from a court-based treaty that the US is not party to.

15. The Commission notes that the Commission has not taken into account the fact that the measures in question are in line with the MEIP. United States: when a violation is documented, but enforcement remains political

Judgment Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986) is a classic case for the debate about power and international law. The ICJ noted that the United States had violated, inter alia, the obligation not to use force against Nicaragua and the obligation not to interfere in its internal affairs; the judgment also addressed support for Contras and other operations.

The case is important precisely because it is not a political label "terrorism." The Court of First Instance applied specific legal rules of state responsibility and the prohibition of the use of force. It also shows the limit of international justice: judicial decisions and the practical ability to enforce its consequences are two different things, particularly when the dispute concerns a permanent member of the Security Council.

The ICJ and ICC must be strictly distinguished. The ICJ is dealing with national disputes and advisory issues; the ICC is prosecuting individuals for the most serious international crimes. To confuse them means to confuse state responsibility with the criminal responsibility of a natural person.

16. UN Security Council and veto: a legal system built into the power hierarchy

Article 27 of the UN Charter states that the non-procedural decisions of the Security Council need nine positive votes and the consent of permanent members in practice, implemented by veto law. So five permanent members - the US, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom - have special powers that other Member States do not have.

This is the institutional compromise of 1945: the collective security system was built to keep the main military powers within and outside the organisation. The price is formal inequality. Veto may prevent resolutions with enforcement measures or referral of the ICC situation; however, it does not automatically block all national courts, contracting authorities, ICJ or investigations initiated by other jurisdictions.

When a permanent member protects himself or a close ally, a strong impression of double standards arises. The same structural problem, however, concerns all five veto holders. Critics should therefore be directed towards the institution and the specific vote, not the idea that veto is an American speciality.

17. Penalties, material support and humanitarian space

Anti-terrorism and sanctions regimes have a legitimate security objective: to reduce funding, movement and logistics of organisations that commit attacks on civilians. However, in armed conflicts, they may have a side effect on humanitarian organisations that must negotiate access to civilians in a territory controlled by a designated group.

ICRC It points out in the long term that anti-terrorism measures must not effectively criminalise the impartial humanitarian activity envisaged by the IHL. The practical problem can be payment of local fees, purchase of fuel, contact with the commander of checkpoint, medical care or training in IHL. In legal practice, humanitarian exemptions and licences are therefore created.

This is one of the best examples of why 'harder anti-terrorism law' is not automatically the same as' better protection of civilians'. Too wide a ban can weaken the organisation financially, but at the same time make it difficult to deliver water, food or health care to the people controlled by the organisation.

18. Political power of the "terrorism" label

Legal design has measurable effects, but the word terrorism also works as a political category. It can delegitimize the opponent, narrow down the negotiating space and change the media framework. Therefore, it is useful to separate three levels: Legal status, description of the specific act of violence and political characteristics of the actor.

Historically, one organisation can combine political parties, social services, armed forces, terrorist attacks and territorial governance. Legal systems must then decide whether to assess the organisation as a whole, a specific wing or a specific person. The US material support regime is based on the view that coordinated resources can strengthen the organisation as a whole; other legal systems can distinguish more from some structures.

Critical work is therefore not supposed to begin with the question of 'which side we love', but the question: what action has been taken, against whom, with what purpose, in what legal context and which authority has the power to decide?

19. AI, OSINT and taking evidence: more information does not automatically mean more justice

Digital open-source investigation radically reduced the cost of some forms of verification. Satellite images, video, geolocation, chronolocation, flight and ship databases, metadata, financial documents and social networks allow for reconstruction of events that would previously remain dependent on state archives. Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations establish procedures for the collection, analysis and preservation of digital material applicable in the investigation of human rights violations, IHL and international criminal law.

AI can accelerate this process: sort millions of images, look for time changes, recognize recurring objects, translate documents or find links between sources. At the same time, it may create a new risk - hallucinations, poor classifications, synthetic content and opaque models. Therefore, the auditable chain of proof is crucial: the original file, hash, metadata, the way in which to obtain, each transformation and independent confirmation.

19.1. Evidence is not a jurisdiction

Even a perfect video, satellite image or data correlation does not solve a question which court has jurisdiction, whether a person is protected by immunity, whether the subject is admissible and whether the suspect can be arrested. Technological progress reduces information asymmetry faster than institutional asymmetry.

20. Thought experiment: what if the public knew all the secret operations of the great powers

Imagine a world in which every person would have a complete and verified approach to the history of all covert operations, coups, support for armed groups, intelligence programs and hidden financial flows of all the great powers - the US, Russia, China, European powers, and regional states. The experiment does not remove different values or security interests, only information asymmetry.

The first anticipated effect would be reputational. Countries whose public rhetoric is most dissociated with documented practice would lose a soft power. The second effect would be domestic: information would enter the elections, parliamentary investigations, litigation and public opinion. The third effect is realistic: military bases, industrial capacity, nuclear weapons and financial infrastructure would not disappear simply by becoming transparent.

The result would therefore not be an automatic "collapse" of one country. Rather, full knowledge would change the relative costs of hypocrisy, covert operations and denial. If transparency were to apply asymmetrically to one power alone, it would put it at a disadvantage. If it were universal, it would offer a truly comparable test of state practice for the first time.

21. Practical analytical framework for a specific incident

Instead of arguing about the sticker, each incident can be broken down into a sequence of questions:

Only after this decomposition is there any point in dealing with whether the word 'terrorism' is legally accurate, politically useful, or only one of several of the currently applicable categories.

22. Resolution 1373: When the Security Council created global anti-terrorism obligations

UNSCR 1373 was adopted unanimously. 28 1 September 2001 under Chapter VII of the Charter. It did not include a list of one particular organisation, but imposed a wide range of obligations on all states: criminalise terrorist financing, freeze the assets of persons involved in terrorism, not provide safe hiding and strengthen police and judicial cooperation. At the same time, Counter- Terrism Committee was created, which monitors implementation. UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001).

From a constitutional point of view, the resolution is remarkable: the Security Council has not only issued an order relating to one crisis, but has laid down general legislative obligations for all Member States. Critics are talking about the 'quasi-legislative' role of a 15-member body; advocates stress that cross-border financial and logistical networks required a uniform minimum standard. The dispute shows a wider problem of global counter-terrorism: speed and efficiency can be in tension with representativeness and due process.

23. UN Sanctions List 1267 / 1989 / 2253: assets, travel, weapons and due process

The United Nations regime for ISIL and Alqaeda imposes three main measures on Member States against designated individuals and entities: asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. Unlike the US FTO, this is a list of the Security Council, the effects of which the Member States must implement. UN Security Council - 1267 / 1989 / 2253 sanctions.

Long-term criticism concerned the procedural rights of designated persons: how to identify the reasons for classification, how to present an argument against it and how to achieve a strike out. The system therefore acquired the Ombudsperson institution for delisting applications. It is not a full international court, but it is an attempt to introduce a more independent procedural control into the security penalty regime.

24. Terrorism financing: from bank transfer to cryptocurrencies and crowdsourcing

Terrorism financing is not the same as money laundering. The money used for a terrorist act may come from criminal activity, but also from legal business, small donations or personal resources. The FATF therefore calls for the criminalisation of the financing of terrorist acts, terrorists and organisations and the introduction of targeted financial sanctions. UN Counter-Terrorism Committee also draws attention to the abuse of business firms, natural resources, kidnappings, crowdfunding and virtual assets. FATF - Terrorist Financing.

Financial control is attractive because it can disrupt the network before the attack. But it has a side effect: banks and charities can choose to take too careful "de-risk" and reject transactions even where the humanitarian purpose is legal. That is why the UN adopted Resolution 2664 with humanitarian exception from some asset freezes and the FATF amended the Recommendation 6 in 2026 in order to better reflect this exemption into national regimes. UNSC 2664 · FATF update 2026.

25. AUMF 2001: a domestic war mandate that survived the original battlefield

American Congress after 11. On September, the Authority adopted the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which enabled the President to use the necessary and appropriate force against persons and organisations associated with the attacks. The following administrations interpreted it as a domestic legal basis for operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and "associated forces" in several countries. This is a different issue than international legal authority to enter with force into the territory of a particular state.

Therefore, a legal analysis must run two parallel tests for each operation: Does the President have domestic authorization under U.S. law? and is there a separate title under international law - state consent, Security Council or self-defence mandate? The mixing of these planes creates a false impression that Congress law can itself legalize the use of force against another state.

26. Drones and Targeted Killings: Technology does not change the basic legal test

An armed drone is not automatically legal or illegal under international law. The context is the key. The IHL rules apply in armed conflict: target status, differentiation, proportionality and prevention. Outside an armed conflict, the right to live under international human rights has a significantly more restrictive framework for intentional killing. Another separate issue is the sovereignty of the state in whose territory the attack is taking place.

The UN Human Rights Committee criticised the lack of transparency, a broad understanding of the geographical scope of the conflict and the ambiguity of certain criteria of imminent threat for American extracurricular drone strikes. On the contrary, the US government has argued in the long term by armed conflict with specific groups and the right of self-defence. The dispute is not about technology, but about the border of the battlefield and the standard that a man can be killed outside his own territory.

27. Detention, extraordinary surrender and torture: counter-terrorism is subject to absolute prohibition

After 11. On September, a detention system was established, Guantánamo, CIA "black sites" and extra-ordinary return. Legally, it is essential that the prohibition of torture is not a flexible instrument balanced by the importance of the threat. The Convention against Torture and other human rights regimes formulate it as an absolute ban. Similarly, the designation of a terrorist does not remove habeas corpus, procedural guarantees or protection under the IHL where it applies.

This experience shows a more general risk: the extraordinary powers created for extreme threats tend to institutionalise themselves. Therefore, the control of the courts, Congress, inspectors, media and international institutions is not an obstacle to counter terrorism, but is part of the test of whether security policy itself undermines the rule of law that it is intended to protect.

27.1 Abu Ghraib: individuals, command and system conditions

The photos from Abu Ghraib's Iraqi prison have shown the humiliation, abuse and abuse of American personnel. The event cannot be explained honestly either as several isolated excesses without a broader context, nor as evidence that each member of the coalition forces acted the same way. The investigation of the US military described serious abuses, insufficient training, unclear liability distribution between military police and intelligence, and weak command oversight. Later conclusion of the Senate Committee He also linked a broader problem to the transfer of hard interrogation procedures created for survival training into real detention.

The documentation therefore requires several levels of responsibility: direct action by specific persons, criminal and disciplinary sanctions, the responsibility of the supervisory commanders and the institutional environment in which the border between the legal interrogation and prohibited treatment has been blurred. Overview of military inquiries summarizes the official history of the US Army On Point II; the legal and humanitarian framework shall be complementary to: analysis of Schlesinger's message in the ICRC database. The photographs capture only a part of the events and do not explain the complete decision-making chain themselves.

28. Terrorism statistics: number of attacks depends on the definition of the database

Terrorism databases are not simply summing up objectively marked events. It must decide whether to include violence in the civil war, attack on soldiers, attack on a state actor, failed attempt or incident with unclear motive. Two databases can therefore show different numbers in fair methodology.

When comparing countries and epoch, codebook: unit analysis, definition of a civilian target, treatment of insurency and method of work with uncertainty. Otherwise, data becomes political illustrations instead of measurements.

29. Symmetric test: same rules for allies, opponents and own state

The most useful method is to avoid the question of 'is terrorism?' as a first step and to ask a series of more specific questions instead: who is the target player, is in the process of armed conflict, what is the intention, what rules of the IHL or human rights apply, there is a legal title for using force and what evidence supports the claim of responsibility.

Only then does it make sense to examine whether the conduct at the same time falls within the specific domestic or penal definition of terrorism. This procedure leads to a more symmetrical outcome: the deliberate attack on civilians is not less serious because it was committed by an ally, and the violation of sovereignty is not automatically legalized by the aim being an organization called a terrorist.

30. Conclusion

The biggest source of confusion in the debate on terrorism is not the lack of laws, but the overlay of them. American law uses different definitions for criminal, immigration, sanctions and foreign policy purposes. International law, in turn, divides violence between the prohibition of the use of force, the IHL, human rights, state responsibility and individual criminal liability.

This leads to a double conclusion. First, American design is not a universal judgment over an actor; it is a legal act of the US system with concrete consequences. Secondly, the fact that state violence is often not marked by the same word as that of a non-state group does not mean that it is outside the law. More precise categories - aggression, war crime, crime against humanity, torture, illegal intervention - can be legally more serious than the rhetoric label "terrorism."

Therefore, the most convincing criticism of the two standards is not that every act of a great power is renamed terrorism. It says that he applies the same standard of proof to both allies and opponents, the same rules of civil protection and the same question of legitimacy to the use of force.

31. Primary and methodological resources